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 Abstract 
Many cases of externalities in agricultural production such as pesticide drift, cross-
pollination, and offensive odors are attributable to the incompatibility of neighboring land 
uses. This paper offers an examination of when an efficient activity arrangement is 
compatible with free-market incentives. Also, free-market and socially efficient activity 
arrangements are characterized in terms of spatial concentration of the externality 
generating uses. 
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SPATIAL ARRANGEMENTS OF EXTERNALITY GENERATING  
AND RECEIVING ACTIVITIES 
Introduction 
In recent years, agricultural markets analysts have paid increasingly more attention 
to the spatial concentration of production in both animal and crop agriculture. In 
particular, the geographic concentration of production of main field crops in several 
growing regions is a distinctive feature of the U.S. agricultural landscape. Geographic 
production patterns are shaped by a host of factors, including soil qualities, proximity to 
input markets, vertical integration, farm size, and the marketing environment. In this 
paper I will focus on another essential feature of the grower’s decision environment: the 
presence of spatial externalities due to multiple land uses. 
A number of externalities in agricultural production, such as pesticide drift, cross-
pollination, invasion by foreign species and predators, offensive odors, industrial 
emissions and pollution, are well documented. For example, the negative impacts of 
livestock feeding operations on the values of residential properties located in the close 
vicinity are studied in Herriges, Secchi, and Babcock 2003. Damage to cotton due to the 
herbicide applied on rice planted in the surrounding area and damage to an olive crop 
produced in the vicinity of cotton are two examples of externalities in crop agriculture 
(Parker 2000). Another common occurrence of spatial externality is the danger of cross-
pollination impairing the quality of the crop delivered by seed growers (Perkins 2003). 
The same is true for the potential contamination between non-genetically modified and 
genetically modified crop varieties (Belcher, Nolan, and Phillips 2003; Munro n.d.; 
Brasher 2003). For example, certified organic crop production may entail buffer zones 
with sizes varying depending on the types of crops grown on adjacent farms. 
The damage from many types of externalities is frequently attributable to the 
incompatibility of neighboring land uses and declines with the distance between the 
externality generator and recipient (e.g., see Baumol and Oates 1998; Helfand and Rubin 
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1994; Albers 1996; Parker 2000). This implies that concentrating externality generators 
in a certain area may decrease the total cost imposed on the recipients. The concentration 
of generators has two counteracting effects on the distribution of damages across the 
recipients. On the one hand, the total number of immediate “border” neighbors with 
incompatible uses decreases. On the other hand, the “bordering” recipients are located 
next to a greater number of generators. The result is a more dispersed distribution of 
externality damages among the recipients. However, if the damage to a recipient from 
multiple externality generators accumulates quickly, a socially efficient arrangement of 
land uses may lead to spreading of the generators.1 This is because a lower level of 
spatial concentration of generators spreads out the externality damages more evenly 
across the recipients.  
Agricultural policymakers have developed a number of intervention tools designed 
to improve the efficiency of land-use arrangements, such as zoning orders, emission 
regulations, size restrictions, buffer zones, various environmental standards, and other 
types of legislation. In this light, it is interesting to examine when a given socially 
efficient land-use arrangement can be implemented through competitive markets by 
assigning the land uses (e.g., zoning orders) without any further regulation. The question 
of the choice of a policy instrument to correct for externalities when the damages must be 
spread out or concentrated in certain areas of the region is studied in Helfand and Rubin 
1994; Baumel and Oates 1998; and Dosi and Tomasi 1994 in different settings.2  
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, free-market and socially efficient land use 
arrangements are characterized in terms of spatial concentration of the externality 
generating uses. Second, a policy perspective is taken and production environments are 
found such that the efficient arrangements are implementable in a free-market setting. 
The two issues are related because the alignment of the free-market incentives with the 
efficiency considerations depends, in part, on the efficient level of generator 
concentration. While the implementability alone does not guarantee that the efficient 
arrangement will be realized in the free-market setting, it guarantees that, once the 
efficient arrangement is achieved, no further policy measures need to be taken. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, a model is developed, and the 
conditions needed for the existence of equilibrium in the free-market setting are 
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established. Then, geometric configuration patterns of the free-market arrangements are 
studied under different conditions on the externality dissipation across farms in the 
region. After that, the efficient arrangement that minimizes the total loss due to 
externality damages imposed on the recipients for a given amount of output is 
investigated in several special cases. The level of generator concentration is 
characterized, and a determination is made as to whether the efficient arrangement is 
implementable in the free-market setting. This analysis is followed by an inquiry into the 
effects of the rate of externality accumulation on the efficient arrangement, and 
concluding remarks. 
 
Model 
Let },...,1{ nN =  denote the set of farms (convex and non-overlapping plots of land) or 
agents located in a region described by a square nn×  matrix fD }{ fijd= , where 
f
ijd },...,2,1{ ρ∈  is the distance between farms i  and j , ji ≠ , with 0=fiid , for Nji ∈, .3 
Each agent operates one farm, all farms are of the same size, which is normalized to one, 
and each farm produces a unit of one of the two crops: the externality “recipient” crop, r , 
or the externality “generator” crop, g .4 Farm i  that produces the generator crop imposes a 
negative externality on all farms j i≠  if they produce the recipient crop, and the damages 
decrease with the distance between the farms. At the farm level, the damage imposed by 
the generator j  on the recipient i  is given by )( fijij dd γ= , where 0(.) >γ  is the 
externality dissipation function. It is a decreasing function of the (“geographic,” 
“agronomic,” or “economic”) distance between the farm plots.5 Let }{ ijdD =  denote the 
matrix of the potential individual externality damages between any two farms in the region 
with distance matrix fD . The per acre cost of producing the externality receiving crop on 
farm i  is then given by )(
1 iii
n
j jiji
ededCc −= ∑ = , where ie  denotes the type of crop 
produced on farm i : 1=ie  for the generator crop, and 0=ie  for the recipient crop. The 
function (.)C  is (strictly) increasing, and reflects the rate of accumulation of the externality 
damage on an individual farm. 
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The per acre values of the two crops gross of all production costs except for the 
externality damages are rv  and gv . These values are certain and common for all farms.6 
The premium net of the externality damage decreases with the output of the recipient 
crop (increases with the output of the generating crop): )(svvv gr =− , where ∑== ni ies 1  
is the amount of the generating crop. To assure that there is an incentive to produce both 
crops, we hold that )(nv ii
n
j ij
dd −> ∑ =1  for some i , and 0)0( <v . 
 
Free-Market Equilibrium 
In a free-market setting, farmers make their production decisions (choose the best 
response) in accordance with 
 ],max[)( gi
r vcvi −=Π , (1) 
so that 
0
* 1 ≤−−= igr cvvie , where 01 ≤x  is an indicator function. Therefore, in a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium (PSNE), a set of farms that generates the externality is given by 
 }0:{* ≤−−= igr cvviG ,  (2) 
where )( *
1
*
iii
n
j jiji
ededCc −= ∑ = , ∑ =−=− nj jgr envvv 1 * )( , 1* =je  if *Gj∈ , and 0* =je  
otherwise. In general, one cannot guarantee the existence or uniqueness of the 
equilibrium set *G  defined by equation (2). The Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist if 
the (potential) costs imposed by generators on each other are sufficiently high compared 
with the costs imposed on any recipient. The spatial characteristics of the region must 
allow for a land-use arrangement with some degree of the concentration of generators.  
Formally, this can be stated as follows. The existence of the PSNE is equivalent to 
the existence of a number }1,...,2{* −∈ ns  and a permutation of farm indices )(ii π→  
such that ∑∑ == ≥− sj jhllsj jl ddd 1 )(),()(),(1 )(),( ππππππ  for any *1 sl ≤≤ , nhs ≤≤+1* , and 
)( *sv  ],[ cc∈ , where )(max *
* 1 )(),(,..,1
∑ =+== sj jinsi dCc ππ  and ∑ ===
*
* 1 )(),(,..,1
(min s
j jisi
dCc ππ  
))(),( iid ππ− . Then the PSNE land-use arrangement is *1* )( siie ≤=π . The required condition 
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on the externality impacts across farms asserts that the assigned land uses are, in fact, the 
best responses for each farm. For example, for a given number of generators s , the PSNE 
exists if there is a permutation of the impact matrix D  such that there is an s  by sn −  
zero submatrix below the main diagonal. Next, we characterize a region (impact matrix) 
where the PSNE with a certain arrangement of generators always exists, and furthermore, 
the number of generators is unique (possibly up to a scale parameter). (Proofs of results 
are available in the Appendix.)  
 
RESULT 1. Suppose that ∑∑ −== + ≤ 11 ,1 ,1 sj jssj js dd  for all 1,...,2 −= ns , and 1221 dd ≤ , Then 
there exists the PSNE with *1* siie ≤= , and *s  is uniquely determined by =);( * βsv  
β ],[)(ˆ * ccsv ∈  for some scale parameter 0>β , =c ∑ = +* *1 ,1 )( sj jsdC , and =c  
)( 1
1 ,
*
*∑ −=sj jsdC .  
 
The characteristics of the region’s impact matrix guarantee that in any arrangement where 
the first s  farms are generators and the last sn −  farms are recipients, the potential 
damage borne by each generator exceeds the actual damage borne by each recipient. This 
is illustrated using two impact matrices with a simple algebraic structure that will be 
frequently employed throughout the paper. 
  
EXAMPLE 1. (Sum Impact Matrix) Let jiij bad +=  for Nji ∈, . Here the externality 
damage received by farm i  from the externality generating farm j  is the sum of the 
recipient’s susceptibility, ia , and the generator’s intensity, jb . The condition 
guaranteeing the existence of the PSNE becomes 11( )
s
s jj
a b+= +∑  11( )s s jj a b−=≤ +∑ , or 
1+− ss aa sba ss /)( +≥  for all 1,...,2 −= ns . That is, the susceptibility of each generator 
is larger than that of each recipient. Furthermore, the magnitude of the difference in 
susceptibilities increases with both the generator’s susceptibility and intensity and 
decreases with the number of the operating generators. For example, let ii ba =  for all 
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Ni∈ . Then the condition becomes 1)/21( +≥− ss aas , that is, the region must be such 
that the farm “size” decreases with the farm index, and the magnitude of the fall in size 
decreases with the number of generators.7  
 
EXAMPLE 2. (Product impact matrix) Let jiij bad =  for Nji ∈, . In this case, the 
externality damage received by farm i  from the externality generating farm j  is the 
product of the recipient susceptibility, ia , and the generator intensity, jb . The condition 
guaranteeing the existence of the PSNE becomes ∑∑ −== + ≤ 111 1 sj jssj js baba , or ss aa /1+  
1)/1(
1
<−≤ ∑ =sj js bb  for all 1,...,2 −= ns . As before, the susceptibility of each 
generator is larger than that of each recipient. Furthermore, the magnitude of the fall in 
the susceptibility for two farms with consecutive indices, i  and 1+i , increases with the 
i ’s generating intensity and decreases with the generating intensities of farms with 
smaller indices. 
Regions Where the PSNE Fails to Exist 
In general, equilibrium with a strictly positive number of both recipients and 
generators may fail to exist for two distinct reasons. First, while the spatial distribution of 
costs is compatible with the PSNE, the price premium may not be (quantitative failure). 
Second, for any price premium, the spatial distribution of costs may not be compatible 
with the PSNE. In the former case, a tax or subsidy scheme common to all growers 
resolves the problem. In the latter case, the failure is more fundamental because any 
intervention needs to be heterogeneous at the grower level. For example, for any price 
premium )(sv , no equilibrium in pure strategies exists for the region with the impact 
matrix 1=ijd  for ji ≠  and 0=iid , as depicted in Figure 1 for 4=n . Informally, the 
region must be sufficiently big so that the externality damages vary within the region, 
which may allow the “neighborhoods” of generators to form. 
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FIGURE 1. A “small” region where no PSNE exists 
 
Basically, the equilibrium does not exist if it is impossible to form a configuration 
where farms of one type bordering the farms of another type have no incentive to switch. 
Next, we characterize one class of distance matrices that possess this property.8 
 
RESULT 2. Suppose that || jid fij −=  for all i , Nj∈ . Then there is no PSNE for any 
price premium )(sv  and externality dissipation function )(ργ . 
 
The PSNE fails to exist because all ρ -distant neighbors of each farm are either ( ρ -1)- or 
( ρ +1)-distant neighbors of an immediate neighbor of that farm. Furthermore, there is at 
most one ρ -distant neighbor of each farm that is also a ( ρ +1)-distant neighbor of an 
immediate neighbor of that farm. Therefore, if two immediate neighbors have 
incompatible land uses, the externality damage to the recipient will exceed that of the 
generator. This is because the recipient always has at least one unit of damage more than 
the neighboring generator. For example, a region consisting of square lots located on a 
one-lot-wide strip of land, as in Figure 2, satisfies the condition in the result. 
 
 
FIGURE 2. A “stretched” region where no PSNE exists 
 
On the other hand, if the PSNE exists, there are areas with a high concentration of 
generators and areas with a high concentration of recipients because of the inverse 
relationship between the distance and the externality impact. Let }:{)( ρρ == fiji djM  
denote the set of neighbors of farm i  located at distance ρ . Suppose that the externality 
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is local in the sense that 0)( =ργ  for all ρρ ˆ> . Then, informally, in the PSNE 
generators are concentrated (agglomerated) in groups of “size” ρ  because from hl cc >  
for *Gl∈  and *Gh∉  it follows that 0])[(ˆ
1 )(
*
)(
* ≥−∑ ∑∑= ∈∈ρρ ρρργ hl Mi iMi i ee . This 
implies that each generator has more ρ -distant neighbors than any recipient for some 
radius ]ˆ,1[ ρρ ∈ , ∑∑ ∈∈ ≥ )( *)( * ρρ hl Mi iMi i ee . That is, generators are not “too” spatially 
dispersed and are, at least to some extent, clustered together in order to absorb more 
externality damage than the surrounding recipients. In this light, it is interesting to 
examine the geographical patterns of the PSNE land-use arrangements for different 
distance matrices, fD , and for the externality dissipation functions, )(ργ . 
Properties of Free-Market Arrangements When the Dissipation Function Is Concave 
In this section, some geometric characterizations of equilibrium farm configurations 
are provided. To this end, let ftj
f
ti ddtjiU == :{),,( ρ  }ρ+  denote the set of farms closer 
to j  than to i  by ρ  (closer to i  than to j  by ρ−  if ρ  is negative, or equi-distanced 
from j  and i  if ρ  is zero). We hold that the distance matrix satisfies the condition that 
),,(1,0,1 ρρ jiU−=∪  N=  for any ji,  with 1=fijd .  
 
DEFINITION 1. A set L  is said to be locally agglomerated if for any Lji ∈,  and Lh∉  
such that 1== fjhfih dd  it is true that ∅≠∪∩ )]0,,()1,,([)1,,( jhUjhUihU  or )1,,( jhU  
)1,,([ ihU∩ ∅≠∪ )]0,,( ihU . 
 
Consider a set of farms L , and an “outsider” farm (not in the set) that is located 
immediately next to two “insiders” in the set. The set L  is locally agglomerated in the 
sense that the edge of the set is “somewhat” rounded toward the outside. That is, it is 
impossible to have a recipient that is surrounded by generators from the opposite sides, 
)1,,()1,,( hjUihU ⊆  and )1,,()1,,( hiUjhU ⊆ , and all three lie on the straight line. This 
is because at least some members of the set are closer to the “edge” members than to 
the outsider. Next, we ascertain that the equilibrium farm configuration possesses this 
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weak property when the externality dissipates at an increasing rate as distance 
increases.9  
 
RESULT 3. Suppose that the externality dissipation function )(ργ  is concave. Then the 
set of generators *G  is locally agglomerated in the PSNE. 
 
Note that the dissipation function )(ργ  is held to be non-negative, non-increasing, 
and concave for all ],0( ρρ ∈ . This implies that the externality generated from any point 
of the region is “felt” throughout the entire region (except for the edges of the region). To 
characterize global geometric properties of the equilibrium generator set, we make the 
following assumptions about the region where farms are located. 
Consider a region with Euclidean distances between farms, which are represented by 
points in the plane. An example is a rectangular grid with farms located in the grid points. 
The Euclidean distance measure implies that any point k  that lies on a straight line 
between points i  and j  is a convex combination of these points. Therefore, the distances 
from any arbitrary point x  in the plane to points k , i , and j  are connected by the 
inequality fix
f
kx dd λ≤ )1( λ−+ fjxd , where ]1,0[/ ∈= fijfjk ddλ  and fijfik dd /1 =− λ  since 
f
kj
f
ik
f
ij ddd += . The following definition is a version of convexity suitable for a discrete 
finite set of points.  
 
DEFINITION 2. A set of farms L  is agglomerated if for any Lji ∈,  with fkjfikfij ddd +=  it 
follows that Lk ∈ . 
 
That is, a set of farms is agglomerated if it contains all farms that lie on the shortest 
path (a line) between farms i  and j  in the set. The following result establishes that the 
equilibrium set of generators is agglomerated, if the externality dissipates “slowly” 
over the entire region, and the distances between farms are measured using the 
Euclidean metric. 
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RESULT 4. Suppose that the externality dissipation function )(ργ  is concave, and the 
distance matrix fD  is such that fjx
f
ik
f
ix
f
jk
f
kx
f
ij dddddd +≤  for any Nkji ∈,,  with 
f
kj
f
ik
f
ij ddd +=  and Nx∈ . Then the set of generators *G  is agglomerated in the PSNE. 
 
On the other hand, in many agricultural contexts, the externality only impacts the 
immediate “border” neighbors and dissipates quickly, which is inconsistent with the 
global concavity of the dissipation function. The equilibrium land-use arrangements in 
these cases are investigated next. 
Properties of Free-Market Arrangements When the Externality Impact Is Local 
Suppose that generators impact only immediate neighbors within a unit radius, 
11)( ≤= ρργ . And so, the externality damage imposed on a recipient is equal to the 
number of the neighboring generators, ∑∈= )1( *iMi ii ez .10 Let )(4 aD  and )(8 aD  denote 
the impact matrices corresponding to a × a  square grids consisting of identical farms 
(cells) each having no more than, respectively, four and eight neighbors within a unit 
radius (with the exception of the cells at the edges of the region). In the case of 4D , a cell 
i  has one immediate east, west, south, and north neighbor j  if they share a common 
border, 1=ijd ; otherwise, 0=ijd . In the case of 8D , two cells i  and j  are immediate 
neighbors, 1=ijd , if they share either a common border or a common corner; otherwise, 
0=ijd . 
A set of farms G  is a neighborhood (a connected graph), if for any Gji ∈,  there is 
a sequence of immediate neighbors in the set, Ggg k ∈,...,1 , such that 11 =+f gg ttd  for 
1,...1 −= kt , ig =1  and jgk = . The quick dissipation of the externality impact suggests 
that a plural number of generator neighborhoods may exist in equilibrium because farms 
that are not in the immediate vicinity of each other are effectively independent in terms of 
externality damage. 
 
RESULT 5. Suppose that the externality is local, 11)( ≤= ρργ .  
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 (a) Let )(4 aDD =  with 2an = , 3≥a . Then the generators are arranged in 
rectangular neighborhoods containing at least four farms, and 1≤iz  if 0* =ie  for all 
Ni∈ .  
 (b) Let )(8 aDD =  with 2an = , 3≥a . Then the generators are arranged in 
square neighborhoods containing exactly four farms, if 2≤iz  for all Ni∈  with 0* =ie . 
Otherwise, the generators are arranged in the (irregular) octagon-shaped neighborhoods 
determined by the intersection of parallel vertical, horizontal, and diagonal lines, and 
3≤iz  for all Ni∈  with 0* =ie .  
 
To prove Result 5, we take into account that farms located at the edge of the region 
have fewer neighbors than farms in the middle of the region. The limited number of 
possible local configurations implied by the simple spatial structure has an immediate 
consequence for the shape of the generator neighborhoods.11 For example, Result 5 implies 
that, in case of 4D )(a , in any PSNE the number of generators, s , is not a simple number, 
],4[ ans −∈ . From Result 5 it also follows that for regions 4D  and 8D  each neighborhood 
of generators is agglomerated. For any *, mGji ∈  and *Gh∉  with 1== jhih dd  it is true 
that )1,,([)1,,( jhUihU ⊂ )]0,,( jhU∪  and )1,,([)1,,( ihUjhU ⊂  )]0,,( ihU∪ , where *mG  
is a neighborhood of generators, ** mGG ∪= , and ∅=∩ ** km GG . An example of a region 
)11(8D  with =n 121 cells and a PSNE with two neighborhoods of generators is depicted 
in Figure 3, where “x” cells are generators and “0” cells are recipients. 
0
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FIGURE 3. Octagon-shaped generator neighborhoods in )11(8D  
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Efficient Land-Use Arrangement 
In this section, we take a policy perspective and look for an efficient land-use 
arrangement that minimizes the total cost of producing the recipient crop for any given 
amount of total production, ∑ = −= ni ii ceseT 1 )1();( :  
 );(min
}{
seT
ie
 subject to sen
i i
=∑ =1 . (3) 
In a linear externality damage case, this is a well-known combinatorial problem that can be 
formulated as a graph partitioning problem, a specific instance of the quadratic assignment 
problem, or a quadratic optimization problem using graph-theoretic or matrix notation 
(Cela 1998; Burkard et al. 1998). This problem arises in a number of settings, including 
facility layout, manufacturing, circuit board and microchip design, parallel computing, and 
numerous other areas of engineering, physics, and management. The graph partitioning 
problem is NP-hard, that is, the time required to find an optimal solution grows 
exponentially with the size of the problem. The variety of the suggested solution algorithms 
based on different approaches can be grouped into four categories: spectral and geometric 
methods, multilevel algorithms, and discrete or continuous optimization-based methods 
(see Hager and Krylyuk 1999 and references therein). We follow the latter approach and 
consider several tractable special cases (Burkard et al. 1997).  
We are interested in two properties of the optimal solution: the degree of concentra-
tion of generators, and the supportability of the efficient arrangement in a free-market 
setting. For the rest of the paper, we assume that the social planner has the ability to set 
the relative prices (common to all producers) for the externality generating and the 
externality receiving products. Then we say that an arrangement is implementable 
through free markets if the assigned land uses are such that the externality damage for 
any recipient is less than the externality damage for any generator.  
To investigate the level of the generator concentration (externality absorption) in the 
efficient arrangement, it is more convenient to work directly with the impact matrix, D . 
We first consider a benchmark case with a linear externality damage and a symmetric 
“regular” impact matrix satisfying the condition ddn
j ij
=∑ =1  for all i . This can be 
interpreted to mean that the region has “rounded edges” and there are no farms in the 
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“middle” of the region.12 After that, the effects of the rate of externality damage 
accumulation and the spatial heterogeneities across the region on the efficient land-use 
arrangement are studied.  
Linear Externality Accumulation and the “Regular” Impact Matrix 
We will need a stronger notion of concentration as compared with the measures of 
concentration used to study the PSNE arrangements. Let ∑ ∑∈ ∈= 1 2),( 21 Li Lj ijdLLq  
∑∈− 1Li iid  measure the potential externality damage imposed by farms in 2L  on farms in 
1L . We say that a set 1L  is more concentrated than a set 2L  if ),(),( 2211 LLqLLq ≥  and 
|||| 21 LL = . The efficient arrangement of generators is more concentrated than any other 
generator arrangement if the greatest degree of externality absorption by generators 
entails the least exposure by the recipients. 
Divide the set of generators in the efficient arrangement into two non-overlapping 
sets 1L  and 2L , GLL =∪ 21 , ∅=∩ 21 LL , }1:{ == ieiG . In the case of a linear 
externality accumulation and a symmetric impact matrix, the total cost, );( seT , can then 
be written as (here, without loss of generality, we take zzC =)( ) 
 )1();(
1 1 ij
n
i
n
j ij
eedseT −= ∑ ∑= = aw QQQ −−= , (4) 
where ),( LNqQ = , ∑ == 2 1 ),(t ttw LLqQ , and ),(2 21 LLqQa = . Informally, the total cost 
is decomposed into three components. The first component, Q , represents the amount of 
the potential impact of generators on all farms in the region. The wQ  measures the degree 
of the concentration of generators within the subsets, and aQ  measures the degree of 
concentration across the subsets of generators. Next, we establish that the efficient 
arrangement of generators is always concentrated under certain conditions on the impact 
matrix. 
Suppose that the impact matrix is symmetric, jiij dd = , 0=iid , and regular, 
ddn
j ij
=∑ =1 , for all i , j . Then minimizing (4) is equivalent to maximizing the total 
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impact of generators on each other, aw QQ + , because the potential impact is fixed, Q  
∑ ∑= == nj ni ijj de1 1* ds= . And so, the efficient arrangement of generators, }1:{ == eie eiG , 
is concentrated. Furthermore, any efficient arrangement satisfies ),( 11 LLq ),(2 21 LLq+  
),( 22 LLq+  ),( 11 LLq≥ ),(),(2 1 XXqXLq ++  for any NX ⊂ , ∅=∩ 1LX  and 
∑∈ 2Li eie ∑∈= Xi ie . Rearranging the last inequality yields ),(),( 121 XLqLLq −  
),((5.0 XXq≥ )),( 22 LLq− , or ))()((5.0)()( GQGQGQGQ wewaea −≥− . That is, there 
is a trade-off between achieving maximal concentration within the subsets of generators 
and across the subsets.  
Incidentally, we find that under these conditions, any (individual) generator absorbs 
more externality damage than any recipient that is not affected by that particular 
generator. This property, of course, does not imply that the arrangement is implementable 
through free markets. Summarizing, we have the following. 
 
RESULT 6. Suppose that the externality accumulation function C  is linear and the impact 
matrix is symmetric, jiij dd = , 0=iid , and ddnj ij =∑ =1  for all i , j .  
 (a) Then the efficient arrangement of generators is concentrated.  
 (b) The externality damage for the generator l  exceeds that of the recipient h , 
hl cc ≥ , if 0=hld . 
 
To demonstrate part (b) of Result 6 we use a standard exchange argument. Observe that a 
generator not only increases the social (and private) costs since it imposes the cost on 
recipients but also decreases the social costs because it does not contribute to the total 
cost by not bearing the damage from other generators. In the efficient arrangement, the 
generating use is assigned to the set of farms that are both more susceptible to externality 
and generate it with lesser intensity as compared to any alternative rearrangement. The 
search for an optimal arrangement is greatly simplified if the impact matrix is separable 
in the sense that the generating intensity of each farm is recipient-invariant, while the 
susceptibility to externality of each farm is generator invariant. Impact matrices 
possessed of this property are considered in the next section. 
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Linear Externality Accumulation and Separable Impact Matrices 
For the ease of exposition, we consider the case of sum and product impact matrices, 
jiij bad +=  and jiij bad = , separately. Any impact matrix with entries of the form 
jiij bad 21 αα += jiba3α+ , where 0,, 321 ≥ααα , will possess the same properties. First, 
we analyze the efficient arrangement for impact matrices from Examples 1 and 2.13 
  
EXAMPLE 3. (Sum and Product Impact Matrix) Let jiij bad += , naaa ≥≥≥ ...21 , and 
nbbb ≤≤≤ ...21 . That is, it is held that farms can be ordered so that the farms with the 
largest susceptibility to externality are also those with the smallest externality generating 
intensity. After a little algebra, the total damage is ∑ == ni iasseT 1();(  )1∑ =− ni iiea  
∑ =−+ ni iiebsn 1)( , where seni i =∑ =1 . The total damage to recipients is minimized when 
si
e
ie ≤= 1 .14  The efficient arrangement assigns generators to farms with the greatest 
susceptibilities, saa ,...,1 , and the least intensities, sbb ,...,1 . 
This arrangement is supportable through free markets if, in addition, 1+− ss aa  
sba ss /)( +≥  for all 1,...,2 −= ns  (see Example 1). In the case of a product matrix, 
jiij bad = , we have −= ∑ =ni iaseT 1();( )1∑=ni iiea ∑=ni iieb1  and the optimal arrangement 
is unchanged. The additional condition required for the efficient arrangement to be 
implementable through free markets is stated in Example 2. 
The efficient arrangement of generators may or may not be concentrated for both 
sum and product impact matrices. In case of a sum matrix, the degree of externality 
absorption is ),( ee GGq ∑ ∑= = += si sj ji ba1 1 )( ∑∑ == +−=+− si iisi ii basba 11 )()1()( , 
where }1:{ siiG e ≤≤= . Only if the sum of generating intensity and susceptibility 
decreases with the farm index, 11 ++ +≥+ ssss baba , is the efficient arrangement of 
generators assuredly concentrated. For example, suppose that the intensities and 
susceptibilities are perfectly negatively correlated, ii aKb −=  for all i , }{max ii aK ≥ . 
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Then the measure of concentration is arrangement-invariant: ),( GGq Ks )1( −=  for any 
G  with sG =|| . 
 
Next, we consider impact matrices where for each farm the (generator-invariant) 
susceptibility and (recipient-invariant) intensity coincide. Because in this case farms 
can no longer be ordered so that the degrees of susceptibility and intensity vary 
inversely, the efficient arrangement turns out to depend on the number of generators 
and the size of the region. 
 
EXAMPLE 4. (Symmetric Sum Impact Matrix) Let jiij aad += , naaa ≥≥≥ ...21 . Here 
the total cost is ∑∑ == −+= nj iinj i easnasseT 11 )2();( , and the optimal solution to (3) 
depends on the sign of sn 2− . Because the susceptibilities (intensities) }{ ia  are non-
increasing, the optimal arrangement is sni
e
ie −≥= 1  if ns <2 , and sieie ≤= 1  if ns ≥2 .  
If the number of generators is small, it is optimal to assign them to smaller farms 
because then the amount of the generated externality is also small. The situation is reversed 
if the number of generators is large because then it is optimal to reduce the overall recipient 
susceptibility. The efficient arrangement is not implementable through free markets in the 
former case, but it may be implementable in the latter (see Example 1). 
The externality cost imposed on the recipient farm h  ( 0=ehe ) is hh sac =  
∑ =+ nj ejj ea1 , while the potential cost for the generator l  ( 1=ele ) is ll asc )2( −=  
e
j
n
j j
ea∑ =+ 1 . If ns <2  and snieie −≥= 1 , the condition lh cc <  cannot be satisfied because 
it implies that lh aa <  for lh < , which contradicts the assumption. On the other hand, for 
ns ≥2  and sieie ≤= 1 , the condition lh cc <  is satisfied, if, in addition, )/21( s−  1+≥ ss aa  
for all 1],...,2/[ −= nns  (see Example 1). 
Observe that the optimal degree of generator concentration, ),( ee GGq )1(2 −= s  
∑ −=n sni ia , is the least for ns <2  with }:{ sniiG e −≥= , and is the largest for ns ≥2 , 
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),( ee GGq ∑ =−= si ias 1)1(2  when eG }:{ sii ≤= . To summarize, the efficient 
arrangement may be supportable if the number of generators is large because then it is 
optimal to assign the biggest farms to the externality generating use. Because the biggest 
farms are not only the “biggest” externality generators but also the “biggest” externality 
recipients (if assigned to the recipient use), the generator farms do not have an incentive 
to alter the assigned activity.  
 
EXAMPLE 5. (Symmetric Product Impact Matrix) Now let jiij aad = , naaa ≥≥≥ ...21 . 
Here the total cost is 2
1
);( zzaseT n
j i
−= ∑ = , where ∑ == nj iieaz 1 , seni i =∑ =1 . This 
quadratic function is minimized by sni
e
ie −≥= 1  or sieie ≤= 1  depending on whether 
>∑∑ +== n si isi i aa 11 ∑∑ −=−−=≤ n sni isni i aa11)( .  
It is easy to check that the last condition is equivalent to ns )(2 ≥< . The optimal 
arrangement assigns the externality generating uses to the farms with the lowest (highest) 
capacity if less (more) than half of all farms are generators. Note that the products of 
partial sums in the optimality condition are minimized when the difference between the 
product terms is maximized because =+∑∑ +== n si isi i aa 11 ∑∑∑ =−=−−= =+ ni in sni isni i aaa 111 . 
Since farm capacity decreases with farm index, we have >−∑∑ −=−−= || 11 n sni isni i aa  
)(≤ ||
11 ∑∑ +== − n si isi i aa  as ns )(2 ≥< . That is, the difference between the total 
generating intensities and recipients’ susceptibilities is maximized when the generators 
have smaller intensities and the recipients are more susceptible, if the number of 
generators is small. In contrast, this difference is maximized when the generators have 
greater intensities and the recipients are less susceptible, if the number of generators is 
large. 
As in the case of a symmetric sum impact matrix, the efficient arrangement is not 
implementable through free markets if ns <2 , but it may be implementable if ns ≥2  
(see Example 2). The externality cost imposed on the recipient farm h  ( 0=ehe ) is hc  
ha= ∑ =nj ejj ea1 , while the potential cost for the generator l  ( 1=ele ) is ejnj jll eaac ∑ == 1(  
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)la− , if 1=eie . If ns <2  and snieie −≥= 1 , the condition lh cc <  cannot be satisfied 
because it implies that lh aa <  for lh < , which contradicts the assumption. On the other 
hand, for ns ≥2  and sieie ≤= 1 , the condition lh cc <  is satisfied, if, in addition, ss aa /1+  
∑ =−< si is aa 1/1  for all 1],...,2/[ −= nns . Also, observe that the optimal degree of 
generator concentration, ),( ee GGq ∑ ∑= +== n si n ij ji aa12 , is the least for ns <2  when eG  
}:{ snii −≥=  and the arrangement is not implementable. The concentration, ),( ee GGq  
∑ ∑= +== si s ij jiaa1 12 , is the largest for ns ≥2  when eG }:{ sii ≤=  and the arrangement is 
implementable through free markets. The generators must be big (have high 
susceptibilities), and the recipients must be small (have low susceptibilities) to assure that 
the actual damages exceed the potential damages from changing the assigned use.  
Convex and Concave Externality Damage Accumulation Functions 
Now we turn to a more general form of the externality damage accumulation 
function. In the non-linear damage accumulation case, not only the sum of the private 
damages but also the distribution of damages among the recipients determines the social 
cost of the arrangement, );( seT . To compare the distributions of damages corresponding 
to the candidate land-use arrangements, we will need the following definitions commonly 
used to measure dispersion (Marshall and Olkin 1979). 
  
DEFINITION 3. A vector ),...,( 1 Nxxx =  is sub-majorized by the vector ),...,( 1 nyyy =  
(denoted by w≺ ) if ∑∑ == ≤ ki iki i yx 1 ][1 ][  for nk ,...,2,1= , where ][]2[]1[ ... nxxx ≥≥≥  and 
][]2[]1[ ... nyyy ≥≥≥  are their components in the decreasing order. 
 
DEFINITION 4. A vector ),...,( 1 Nxxx =  is super-majorized by the vector ),...,( 1 nyyy =  
(denoted by w≺ ) if ∑∑ == ≥ ki iki i yx 1 )(1 )(  for nk ,...,2,1= , where )()2()1( ... nxxx ≤≤≤  and 
)()2()1( ... nyyy ≤≤≤  are their components in the increasing order. 
 
Spatial Arrangements of Externality Generating and Receiving Activities / 19 
As is well-known, the sub-majorization ( yx w≺ ) and super-majorization ( yx w≺ ) 
relations generate classes of the order-preserving functions: increasing Schur-concave 
and increasing Schur-convex functions. A function )(xf  is Schur-convex if yx ≺  
implies that )()( yfxf ≤ . Here ≺  denotes the usual majorization order obtained by 
requiring that ∑∑ == = ni ini i yx 11  in Definition 3 or 4. Suppose that the damage 
accumulation function, )(zC , is convex (concave). For a given number of generators, the 
total damage cost imposed on the recipients, ∑== ni in zCzzT 11 )(),...,( , is increasing 
Schur-convex (Schur-concave) in the damages to recipients, )(ezi  )1(1 i
n
j jij
eed −= ∑ = , as 
a sum of increasing convex (concave) functions. Now imagine that we need to compare 
two arrangements e and e′  with ∑∑ == ′= ni ini i ee 11  in terms of social efficiency. If it is 
known that )()( ezez w ′≺  or )()( ezez w≺′ , then arrangement e ( e′ ) is welfare dominant 
depending on whether )(zC  is convex (concave). Summarizing, we have the following. 
 
RESULT 7. (a) Suppose that there exists a permutation of farm indices )(iφ  such that 
∑ ∑∑ ∑ ∈ ∈++ += = ≤ kSi Lj ijsk si sj ij dd)1( )1( )( )1(φ φ φ φ  for any 1,...,1 −−= snk , NLSk ⊂, , kSk =|| , 
sL =|| , ∅=∩ LSk .  
(b) Suppose that there exists a permutation of farm indices )(iϕ  such that 
∑ ∑∈ =kk Ti sj ijT d)( )1(max ϕ ϕ ∑ ∑∈ ∈≤ kk Si Lj ijS dmax  for any 1,...,1 −−= snk , NLSk ⊂, , 
),...,1({ +⊆ sTk ϕ  )}(nϕ , kST kk == |||| , sL =|| , ∅=∩ LSk . Then the efficient 
arrangement is given by si
e
iee ≤= 1)(π  for Ni∈ , where φπ =e  if C  is concave, and 
=eπ ϕ  if C  is convex. Observe that condition (a) implies that ( ) ( )(1)s h jj dφ φφ=∑  
( )
( 1),(1)
s
h jj
dφ φφ +=≤ ∑  for any h  ,...,1+= s 1−n  , while condition (b) implies that 
∑∑ = += ≥ )( )1( ),1()( )1( ),( sj jhsj jh dd ϕ ϕ ϕϕ ϕ ϕ  for any 1,...,1 −+= nsh . If the impact matrix D  is such 
that both permutations φ  and ϕ  satisfy conditions (a) and (b), respectively, we have 
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n
siic 1)( }{ +=φ
n
siic 1)( }{ +=ϕ≺ . That is, the optimal distribution of damages is more “spread out” 
if the externality damage accumulation function is convex.  
It is easy to check that both conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied with the identity 
permutation φ = i=ϕ  for the product and sum impact matrices considered in Example 3. 
Let the externality from a generator j  to a recipient i  be a sum or a product of the 
recipient’s susceptibility and the generator’s intensity, or a linear combination of these, 
jiij bad 21 αα +=  jiba3α+ , where 0,, 321 ≥ααα  . Suppose that the farms with the 
smallest generating intensities, ib , have the greatest susceptibilities, ia : naaa ≥≥≥ ...21  
and nbbb ≤≤≤ ...21 . From Result 7 it follows that it is optimal to assign the externality 
generating uses to the farms with smallest generating intensities for any shape of the 
damage accumulation function. This is generalized in the following result.     
 
RESULT 8. Let 1,, +≤ jiji dd  and jiji dd ,1, +≥  for all Nji ∈, . Then for any shape of the 
damage accumulation function the efficient arrangement is si
e
ie ≤= 1  for all Ni∈ . 
 
The monotonicity conditions on the individual externality damages shift the “mass” of 
the impact out of the left bottom corner of the externality impact matrix.15  Clearly, the 
product and sum matrices with the inversely ordered susceptibilities and intensities 
considered in Example 3 satisfy the monotonicity conditions. 
Next, we inquire into some effects of the geographical features of a region on the 
efficient arrangement. The level of the concentration of generators in the efficient 
arrangement depends on both the type of curvature of the damage accumulation function 
and the specifics of the spatial interactions and externality dissipation in the region. For a 
concave accumulation function, it may be optimal to let a small number of recipients bear 
most of the externality damage while lowering the damage for other recipients. In 
contrast, for a convex accumulation function, it may be optimal to spread the externality 
damage more evenly among the recipients.16 Therefore, it appears that in the efficient 
arrangement the degree of generator concentration should be greater in the former case 
than in the latter. As the following example demonstrates the specifics of the spatial 
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structure of the region and the externality dissipation function may interact to make the 
effect of the accumulation function curvature on the efficient arrangement ambiguous.  
 
EXAMPLE 6. (Tick-Tac-Toe) Consider a region )3(4D  (see Result 5 for details), where 
only cells with a common border may impact each other. Farms are indexed as depicted 
in Figure 4a. 
 
5 6
8 9
4
7
321
 
(a) 
0 0
0 0
x
0
xxx
 
(b) 
x 0
0 0
x
0
0xx
 
(c) 
FIGURE 4. Efficient land-use arrangements in )3(4D  
 
Let there be four generators, 4=s , and sie ie ≤= 1)(π  for }9,...,1{∈i . Consider the identity 
permutation, ii =)(φ , and let φπ =e , so that the first s  cells are generators (“x”), and 
the last 1−− sn  cells are recipients (“0”) as in Figure 4b. Then the amounts of 
externalities (actual and potential dissipated among the farms) are 21 =xz , 22 =xz , 
13 =xz , 14 =xz , 205 =z , 106 =z , 107 =z , 008 =z , and 009 =z . Consider another arrangement 
with =)(iϕ {1,2,4,5,3,6,7,8,9} as in Figure 4c, and let ϕπ =e . Then the corresponding 
amounts of externalities are 21 =xz , 22 =xz , 24 =xz , 25 =xz , 103 =z , 106 =z , 107 =z , 
108 =z , and 009 =z . Checking all possible permutations )(iπ  reveals that condition (a) 
holds for the distribution in Figure 4b while condition (b) holds for the distribution in 
Figure 4c (up to the reordering of the costs). Note that the distribution of the amounts of 
the received externalities under φπ =e  is majorized (“more uneven than”) by that under 
ϕπ =e , 9 5)( }{ =ix izφ  9 5)( }{ =ix izϕ≺ . 
Turning to the level of generator concentration, note that the arrangement in Figure 
4b is not concentrated, 6),( =ee GGq , }4,3,2,1{=eG , while the arrangement in Figure 4c 
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is concentrated, 8),( =ee GGq , }5,4,2,1{=eG . In the case of a concave externality 
accumulation function, it is optimal to decrease the number of exposed recipients at the 
expense of a “double” exposure for one recipient. In the case of a convex externality 
accumulation function, it is optimal to “even out” the exposure among the recipients at 
the expense of increasing the number of the exposed ones. 
If the externality accumulation function is concave, by Result 5a, the efficient 
arrangement is not supportable by a free market (note that 05 2 1c = > = 3 1xc = ). On the other 
hand, in the case of a convex externality accumulation function, by Result 5a, the efficient 
arrangement is supportable by a free market (note that 0 1jc = 2 xic< =  for all ,j i ).  
 
In general, the efficient arrangements in Result 7 is implementable through free 
markets if condition ∑ => )( )1( )(max sj jisi dπ π π ∑ =≤≤ )( )1( )(min sj jisi dπ π π  holds for φπ = ,ϕ . The 
conditions of efficiency and free-market implementability may or may not be compatible 
as demonstrated in Example 6. In the case of convex externality damage, the efficient 
allocation is more likely to be implementable if the number of generators is large relative 
to the number of recipients. Then the arrangement that is characterized by concentration 
of generators may be optimal even in the convex cost case if the “spreading” of 
generators across the region raises private costs for each recipient (see Example 6). 
Otherwise, the implementability may fail because condition (b) implies that 
∑ =∈ = )( )1(max sj ijiHi dc π π  for ),...,1({ += sH π  )}(nπ  is low. This means that the externality 
impacts are “evenly” spread out across the recipients, which, in turn, implies a small 
degree of the concentration of generators and may violate the condition that the exposure 
to externality for each generator exceeds that for each recipient. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper takes a close look at the arrangement of externality generating and 
externality receiving activities in a region. We consider a distance-dependent 
externality with heterogeneous externality generating intensities and damage 
susceptibilities across the production units in the region. Two types of activity 
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arrangements: free-market and efficient, are studied. The free-market arrangements 
arise as a result of independent decisionmakers playing the Nash game in pure 
strategies. The efficient arrangements minimize the total cost due to the externality 
imposed on recipients by generators for a given amount of output. The level of 
generator concentration in terms of the externality absorption, which may or may not 
coincide with the spatial concentration, is investigated for both free-market and 
efficient arrangements. Broadly speaking, the implementability of the efficient 
arrangement in a free-market setting depends on the spatial characteristics of the region, 
the number of generators, and the curvature of the externality accumulation function. 
We first analyze the benchmark case when the individual damage from the 
externality accumulates linearly under certain restrictions placed on the spatial 
characteristics of the region. In particular, we consider a regular region where the sum of 
the distances from one farm to all other farms is invariant across farms (a regular graph). 
In this case, generators are concentrated in the efficient arrangement, and the free-market 
implementability property feasibly holds. We also investigate a case where the 
susceptibility (if in the receiving use) is invariant to the generator, and the generating 
intensity (if in the generating use) is invariant to the recipient for each farm in the region. 
Here, the efficient arrangement is easily determined, and is likely implementable as long 
as the level of intensity varies inversely with the level of susceptibility for each farm. If 
the generating intensity and susceptibility to the externality are perfectly correlated, the 
efficient arrangement depends on the number of generators and the size of the region. 
Then the arrangement may admit the free-market implementability only if the number of 
generators is large relative to the size of the region.   
Another aspect of the environment under scrutiny is the effect of the rate of the 
externality accumulation on the efficient arrangement. To this end, we use the 
majorization orders, which capture the effect of the curvature of the objective function on 
the optimal arrangement. The conventional wisdom that associates the slow rate of 
damage accumulation with the optimality of concentrating damages and the fast rate of 
damage accumulation with the optimality of spreading damages may be overturned in 
several instances. In the case of the separable impact matrix with inversely related 
intensities and susceptibilities, the efficient arrangement is invariant to the curvature of 
24 / Saak 
the accumulation function. We also consider a simple example that illustrates that a 
higher level of generator concentration does not necessarily lead to a more “uneven” 
distribution of the externality exposure among the recipients. In fact, the distribution of 
the externality exposures among the recipients may be “more even” when the level of 
generator concentration is the highest.  
The issue of the spatial arrangement of conflicting or benefiting activities is not 
confined to crop agriculture; in fact, it is pertinent in other areas of economics such as 
urban economics and social sciences (e.g., Berliant, Peng, and Wang 2000). For example, 
Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2003) use a similar model to study the role of social 
networks in promoting criminal activities and explore the endogenous formation of a 
criminal network. In their framework, affiliated criminals impose a positive externality 
on each other by sharing “trade secrets.” In the agricultural contexts, the spatial 
connection of land lots is ordinarily exogenous to the model. However, some insights 
developed in this paper may be applicable, for example, to the inquiry into the efficiency 
of an allocation of police resources among city districts.  
The model developed in this paper rests on a number of restrictive assumptions, such 
as perfect information among the agents, the observability of the production activities in 
the entire region, and the lack of countermeasures to combat the effects of the externality 
(e.g., pollution abatement) other than the choice of the production activity. The temporal 
dimension of the activity choice and, as a consequence, the fixed costs that are frequently 
associated with changing the land use, as well as the uncertainty of the future income 
flow contingent on the surrounding land uses, are completely left out of the model. 
Relaxing these and other assumptions regarding the participants’ behavior is likely to 
glean valuable insights into the problem of improving the efficiency of the spatial 
arrangement of externality generating and receiving activities.
  
Endnotes 
1. Helfand and Rubin (1994) identify a number of “technical” and “psychological” 
sources of non-convexities in the externality damage accumulation function, which 
cause constant or diminishing marginal damage to the recipient of one more 
additional unit of the externality. 
2. To cite one example of an applied study in this area, Ancev, Stoecker, and Storm 
(2003) investigate the optimal spatial allocation of waste management practices to 
reduce phosphorous pollution in a watershed. 
3. To reflect the potential agronomic influence, the distance may not coincide with the 
Euclidean distance between the (land mass) centers of the two farm plots. 
4. The model can be easily adjusted to account for the heterogeneity in farm size. For 
example, the differences in farm size can be reflected in the distance matrix.  
5.  Explicitly accounting for the variation in farm sizes complicates the exposition. This 
variation can be accommodated by allowing for asymmetry in the externality 
damages. Say, ij jid d> may be attributed to a bigger size of farm j relative to farm i. 
6. The formulation where the externality affects yields rather than production costs is 
accommodated by positing ( )r ri iv p y c= − , where rp  is the per unit price and y is 
the per acre yield for recipient crop. 
7. Here, the association of the susceptibility and intensity parameter with the physical 
size of a farm is somewhat internally inconsistent because the output is held to be 
invariant across farms. 
8. This type of distance matrix plays an important role in discrete optimization 
problems. The impact matrix generated from such a distance matrix, 
{ } (| |)ijD d i j= = γ − , is called a Toeplitz matrix (e.g., see Burkard et al. 1997). 
9. This is a weak version of the separability implied by the hyperplane theorems for 
closed convex sets.  
10. These kinds of environments were modeled using a cellular automata simulation 
program known as the game of life (e.g., see Parker 2000; Belcher, Nolan, and 
Phillips 2003.) Munro (n.d.) assigns a fixed number of externality generating uses in 
a random manner and considers upper and lower bounds on the total externality 
damage imposed on the recipients for D8(20). 
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11. The regions are held to be square mostly for the ease of exposition. In fact, in Figure 
3, the region is rectangular. 
12. A square matrix whose entries are non-negative, and whose rows and columns sum 
to one is called doubly stochastic. The corresponding graph with the doubly 
stochastic adjacency matrix (with the edge weights equal to the distances between 
any two farms) is called regular. 
13. Note that the total externality damage ( ; )T e s  does not depend on the diagonal 
values of the impact matrix, dii. 
14. In the context of the quadratic assignment problem, the results of this sort are 
surveyed in Burkard et al. 1997. 
15. A matrix with this property is sometimes called left-lower graded. This result is an 
easy generalization of Theorem 3.2 in Burkard et al. 1997, p. 7, with one of the 
matrices having entries (1 )ij i jm e e= − , 1i i se ≤=  (right-upper graded). 
16. Different circumstances that may lead to optimal concentration versus spreading 
damages are discussed in Helfand and Rubin 1994. 
 
  
 
Appendix 
Proofs of Results 
Proof of Result 1 
Suppose that generators are located in farms si ,...,1= , and recipients are in the 
remaining farms, nsi ,...,1+= . From the partial sum condition it follows that 
∑ == sj hjh dsc 1)(  ∑ −=≤ 11hj hjd  2 1 11,1 1 1...h l lh j lj ljj j jd d d− − −−= = =≤ ≤ ≤ ≤∑ ∑ ∑  1 ( )s lj lj l d c s= ++ =∑  
for any hsl <≤ . Also, observe that )(min)( scsc isis ≤=  and )(max)( 11 scsc isis +≥+ = . Because 
both costs )(scs  and )(1 scs+  decrease with s , while the premium )(sv  (smoothly) 
increases with s  there exists unique *s  such that [)(ˆ * ∈svβ )( *1* scs + , )( ** scs ] for some 
0>β . Note that the scaling parameter β  is necessary only because *s  is an integer. 
Proof of Result 2 
The proof proceeds in two steps. 
 Step 1. Let }|:|{)( ρρ =−= jijM i . Observe that for any ji,  such that )1(jMi∈  
two properties are satisfied: (a) ⊂)(ρiM )1()1( +∪− ρρ jj MM , and (b) ∩)(| ρiM  
1|)1( ≤+ρjM  for any ],0[ n∈ρ . From property (a) it follows that =)(ρiM )(ρiM  
)1(( −∩ ρjM ))1( +∪ ρjM . 
 Step 2. Suppose that }{ *ie  is a solution to (2), and pick h , Nl∈  such that 0* =he , 
1* =le , and 1|| =− lh . By Step 1, we write ∑ ∑= −∩∈= n MMi ih ji eCc 1 )1()( *)(( ρ ρρ ργ  
))(
1 )1()(
*∑ ∑= +∩∈+ n MMi iji eρ ρρ ργ ∑ ∑= −∩∈> n MMi iji eC 1 )1()( *)(( ρ ρρ ργ  
))1(
1 )1()(
*∑ ∑= +∩∈ ++ n MMi iji eρ ρρ ργ ∑ ∑= ∩+∈ += n MMi iji eC 0 )()1( *)1(( ρ ρρ ργ  
))(
2 )()1(
*∑ ∑= ∩−∈+ n MMi iji eρ ρρ ργ ∑ ∑= ∩+∈ += n MMi iji eC 0 )()1( *)1(( ρ ρρ ργ
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∑ ∑= ∩+∈− n MMi iji e1 )()1( *)(ρ ρρ ργ ))(1 )( *∑ ∑= ∈+ n Mi ij eρ ρ ργ  ∑ = −++≥ nC 1 )()1()1(( ρ ργργγ  
))(
1 )(
*∑ ∑= ∈+ n Mi ij eρ ρ ργ lc= . The first inequality follows because )1()( +> ργργ . The 
third equality follows because 0* =he . The last inequality follows from Step 1, and 
because lMM lh =∩ )0()1(  and 1* =le . Hence, we have lh cc > , which contradicts the 
assumption. Therefore, no equilibrium solution to (2) exists. 
Proof of Result 3 
Suppose that there is Nhji ∈,,  such that 1** == ji ee , 0* =he , and 1== jhih dd , and 
)1,,()1,,( hjUihU ⊆  and )1,,()1,,( hiUjhU ⊆ . Observe that we can write )1,,(1 ihUjfijd ∈=  
)1( −fhjd )1(11 )1,,()0,,( +++ ∈∈ fhjhiUjfhjihUj dd . Using this decomposition we have xc  
∑∈ −= )1,,( )1(( xhUl lfhl edC γ ∑∈+ )0,,( )(xhUl lfhl edγ  ))1()1,,(∑∈ ++ hxUl lfhl edγ , where jix ,= . 
From equilibrium condition hx cc >  and the monotonicity of (.)C  it follows that 
∑∈ −−)1,,( ))()1((xhUl lfhlfhl edd γγ  ∑∈ +−> )1,,( ))1()((hxUl lfhlfhl edd γγ . By assumption it 
follows that >−−∑∈ )1,,( ))()1((hjUl lfhlfhl edd γγ ∑∈ )1,,( )((hiUl fhldγ  lfhl ed ))1( +− γ , and 
∑∈ −−)1,,( ))()1((hiUl lfhlfhl edd γγ ∑∈ +−> )1,,( ))1()((hjUl lfhlfhl edd γγ . Adding the last two 
inequalities yields ∑∑ ∈∈ −∆+−∆ )1,,( 2)1,,( 2 )1()1( hiUl lfhlhjUl lfhl eded γγ , 0>  where )(2 ργ∆  
)2( += ργ )1(2 +− ργ )(ργ+  denotes the second-order difference operator. But this is a 
contradiction because 0)(2 ≤∆ ργ  for all 0>ρ . 
Proof of Result 4 
Suppose that there are three farms Nkji ∈,,  such that 1** == ji ee , 0* =ke , and k  
lies on the shortest path (or a line) between i  and j , fkj
f
ik
f
ij ddd += . Let 
]1,0[/ ∈= fijfjk ddλ  so that fijfik dd /1 =− λ . By assumption we have )1( λλ −+≤ fixfkx dd  
f
jxd  for any Nx∈ . Because the externality dissipation function (.)γ  is decreasing and 
concave it follows that )())1(()( fix
f
jx
f
ix
f
kx dddd λγλλγγ ≥−+≥  )()1( fjxdγλ−+ . Summing 
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over all x  with 1* =xe  yields ∑∑ ≠= ≥ ix xfixnx xfkx eded *1 * )()( γλγ  )1( λ−+  *)( xjx fix ed∑ ≠ γ , 
which implies that ∑∑ ≠= ≥ ix xfixnx xfkx eded *1 * )(min[)( γγ , ])( *xjx fix ed∑ ≠ γ , or kc  
],min[ ji cc≥  by the monotonicity of the externality accumulation function (.)C . But this 
is a contradiction. 
Proof of Result 5  
Part (a). It will be convenient to index cells in the square grid starting in the left-
upper corner and going from the left to the right of each row. Then the horizontal and 
vertical locations of the cell i  are given by ]/)1[( aiyi −=  and ii ayix −= , where ][b  
denotes the integer part of b . In the case of )(4 aD , the externality impacts are given by 
]/)1[(]/)1[(  ,1||||0||,1||1||,0|| 1111 ajaijiajiyyxxyyxxij jijijijid −=−=−=−=−=−=−=− +=+= . To show that a 
generator can border, at most, one generator, suppose that 1)1(max * >− iii ez . Then the 
corner farms must be recipients because 21 ≤=== − nana zzzz . But this implies that any 
farms located in the cells adjacent to the corners must be recipients because we also have 
2≤iz  for {=i anaaa 2,2,1,1,2 −−+ , 1,1,1 −−−+− annan }. But the farms adjacent 
to these cells may have, at most, two neighbors that are generators and thus must be 
recipients as well. Continuing in this manner, we can show that all farms are recipients, 
which cannot be in equilibrium. Hence, in any equilibrium, 1)1(max * ≤− iii ez .  
Next, we show that the generators must be arranged in rectangular neighborhoods. 
Consider a two-by-two fragment of a square cell with farms }1,,1,{ ++++ aiaiii , where 
kai ≠  for any ak ,...,1= . Suppose that there are two generators that are corner 
neighbors, for example, 1* 1
* == ++aii ee . Then any recipient in 1+i  or ai +  must border 
two generators, which is impossible. However, each generator must border at least two 
other generators. Therefore, generators must be arranged in rectangular neighborhoods of 
four or more generators.  
Part (b). For )(8 aDD = , an analogous argument is used to show that 
3)1(max * ≤− iii ez . Suppose that 3)1(max
* >− iii ez . Then the corner farms must be 
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recipients because 31 ≤=== − nana zzzz . But the edge cells adjacent to the corner cells, 
{=i 2, a+1, a-1, 2a, n-2a+1, },1,1 annan −−+− , have, at most, four neighbors that can 
be generators. And so, they must be recipients as well. The same is true for all of the 
remaining edge cells, })3(,...,3{},1)3(,...,13{},2,...,3{ aaaaaaai −+−+−= , 
}2,...,3)1{( −+− naa . Next, remove the (recipient) edge cells of the region and apply the 
same reasoning to the remaining cells. Continue in this manner until the region consists 
of the one cell, ]2/[ni = 1+ , when n  is odd, or the four adjacent cells in the middle, 
2/)1{( aai −= ,  aaaaa +−+− 2/)1(,12/)1( }12/)1( ++− aaa , when n is even. Hence, 
all farms are recipients, which cannot be in equilibrium. It is also clear that no PSNE 
exists if 1)1(max * =− iii ez . Suppose that a recipient i  has one generator neighbor (corner 
or border). Then all neighbors of this generator must be recipients, which is impossible. 
To investigate the geometric configuration of the generator neighborhoods, we need 
to consider two cases: (i) 2)1(max * =− iii ez , and (ii) 3)1(max
* =− iii ez . In case (i), let 
0* =ie  and consider cells surrounding the recipient in cell i , 1|:|{ =−= kikBi , or 
1||or ,|| +=−=− akiaki , or }1|| −=− aki , where kai ≠  for any ak ,...,1= . There 
must be exactly two iBgg ∈21 ,  with 121 == gg ee , and suppose that 1|| 21 +=− ngg . 
Then for 
21 gg
BBj ∩∈ , ij ≠  there must be exactly two jBgg ∈21 ,  with 121 == gg ee . 
But this implies that 2,
21
≤gg zz , which is impossible. Note that neighborhoods of more 
than four generators cannot exist because this would imply that at least one recipient has 
three or more generator neighbors. Because for each generator there must be at least three 
cells gBggg ∈321 ,,  with 1321 === ggg eee , generators must be arranged in square 
neighborhoods of exactly four generators.   
In case (ii), we first make the following observations. Let 0* =ie  and consider eight 
cells surrounding cell i , 1||or ,||or  ,1|:|{ +=−=−=−= akiakikikBi , or || ki −  
}1−= a . The following observations regarding local configurations will be useful. 
Observation 1: Suppose that 1=iz . Then we have ∈∈= },1:{ * ik Bkek 1{ −−= aiK , 
1+− ai , 1−+ ai , 1++ ai }. Otherwise, we have 3≤kz , which is impossible. 
Spatial Arrangements of Externality Generating and Receiving Activities / 31 
Observation 2: Suppose that 2=iz . Then we have KBlklkeelk ilk ∈∈≠== },,,1:,{ **  
},for   22|| ,|| ,1|:|,{ iBlkalkalklklk ∈+=−=−=−= . To prove, suppose that 
lkjje ,
* 1 ==   for all iBj∈  and some pair Klk ∉},{ . Then we have ∑∈ ≥xBt te 4*  for 
lkx ,= . But this implies that there is a iBj∈  with 4≥jz  and 0* =je , which is 
impossible. Observation 3: Suppose that 3=iz . Then we have 
* * *{ , , : 1,  ,k l mk l m e e e k l m= = = ≠ ≠  ∈∈ },,for iBmlk  { , , :| | 1K k l m k l= − =  and 
| | 1,k m− = | | 1k l− =  and | | ,k m a− = || lk −  a=  and 1|| ,|| =−=− lkamk  
and alkamk =−+=− || ,22||  and 22|| +=− amk  for },, iBmlk ∈ . That is, the three 
generators are either located in one of the corners of iB , or along one of the sides of iB , 
or two generators are located at the diagonally opposite corners of iB , and the third 
generator borders one of them. All other cases are ruled because ∑∈ ≥xBt te 4*  for 
mlkx ,,=  implies that there is a iBj∈  with 4≥jz  and 0* =je , which is impossible. 
Because 4min * ≥iii ez , there must exist at least one generator neighborhood G  with 
4|| >G . Pick a recipient i  with 2|| ≥∩GBi  (there are always at least four recipients in 
cells 1, a, n-a+1, and n). It is possible, because if 1|| =∩GBi , by observation 1, there 
must be a recipient in cell gi BBj ∩∈  with 2≥jz , where iBg∈  and 1* =ge . Draw a 
line passing through the common corners of cells iBGg ∩∈  and cell i  that will be 
shown to “separate” i  and G . The line is horizontal if 2=iz  and 1|| 21 =− gg  for some 
GBgg i ∩∈21 , , or 3=iz  and 1 2| | 1g g− =  and 1 3| | 1,g g− =  for some 
GBggg i ∩∈321 ,, , so that ]/)1)[((]/)1[( agai −<>−  for all Gg∈  when i  is “below” 
and “above,” respectively. The line is vertical if 2=iz  and agg =− || 21  for some 
GBgg i ∩∈21 , , or 3=iz  and agg =− || 21 , agg =− || 31  for some 321 ,, ggg  
GBi ∩∈ , so that aaggaaii ]/)1[()(]/)1[( −−<>−−  for all Gg∈  when i  is “to the 
left” and “to the right,” respectively. The line is diagonal if 3=iz  and 1|| 21 =− gg , 
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agg =− || 31  for some GBggg i ∩∈321 ,, , so that we have >+−− )1](/)1[( aagg  
)]1/))[(( −−< ain  or )]1/())[(()1](/)1[( +−<>−−− ainaagg  for all Gg∈  depending 
on the slope of the line and the location of i  relative to G . 
For concreteness, suppose that i  is below G , 3=iz , 1|| 21 =− gg  and || 31 gg −  
=1 for GBggg i ∩∈321 ,, . Then we need to show that ]/)1[(]/)1[( aiag −<−  for all 
Gg∈ . From observations 1, 2, and 3 applied to the recipients in ,:{1 iBrrLj ∈=∈  
,0* =re ∅≠∩GBr  }, and the fact that G  is connected, it follows that ]/)1[( ag −  
]/)1[( ai −<  for GBg j ∩∈ . To induct, assume that the same is true for GBg j ∩∈ , 
where ∈j tL  ,0:{ * == rer }∅=∩GBr  such that tLi∈ , and consider ,:{1 tt LrrL ∈=+  
,0* =re ∅≠∩GBr  } and generators GBg j ∩∈ . For tt LLj /1+∈  with ]/)1[( ai −  
]/)1[( aj −− 2≥  the condition is trivially satisfied. We cannot have ]/)1[( ai −  
]/)1[( aj −− 0<  because of the induction assumption. Then, using observations 2 and 3, 
and the fact that G  is connected, it follows that ]/)1[(]/)1[( aiag −<−  for GBg j ∩∈ , 
1+∈ tLj . Observe that 1+⊆ tt LL . Therefore, for some z  we must have 1+= zz LL  because 
the number of cells is finite. This means that i  and G  must lie on the opposite sides of 
the line. The cases where the recipient is in the corner or on the edge of the region are 
considered completely analogously. Furthermore, each generator neighborhood must 
have obtuse corners formed by the intersection of diagonal and vertical or diagonal and 
horizontal lines. Otherwise, there is a Gg∈  with 3≤gz , which is impossible.  
Proof of Result 6 
Part (b). Suppose the distribution eie  is a socially efficient allocation with 0=ehe , 
1=ele . Then );();( seTseT e ≤  for any eee =  except for 1=he , 0=le . Upon 
substitution, )1()(
, ,
e
ilhi illhj
e
jij ededC −+∑ ∑≠ ≠ )( , hllhj ejhj dedC ++ ∑ ≠  
∑ ∑≠ ≠ +≤ lhi ihlhj ejij dedC, , )( )1( eie− )( , hllhj ejlj dedC ++ ∑ ≠ . Because 0=′′C , we have  
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hc hll
e
i
n
i ih
dced +≤−−∑ = )1(1  )1(1 eini il ed −−∑ =  for each 0=ehe , 1=ele . Rearranging the 
last inequality yields hl cc −  −≥ ∑ =nj ljd1(5.0 ∑ =nj hjd1  hlhl dd 5.0) =− . 
Proof of Result 8 
We need to check both conditions (a) and (b) in Result 7. Note that the monotonicity 
conditions imply that )()(
1 ,111 ∑∑ = ++= =≥= sj jiisj iji dCcdCc  for 1,...,1 −+= nsi . And 
so, to check condition (a), let ii =)(φ  for si ≤≤1  and ini −=)(φ  1++ s  for 
nis ≤≤+1 . Then we have ∑ ∑∈ ∈kSi Lj ijd ∑ ∑∈ ∈≥ kSi Lj ijL dmin  
∑ ∑∈ == kSi sj ijd1 ∑ ∑++ += =≥ )1( )1( 1sk si sj ijdφ φ  for any 1,...,1 −−= snk , NL ⊂ , LNSk \⊆ , 
kLSk =|)(| , sL =||  since the elements entering the last summation are the smallest by 
the monotonicity conditions. To check condition (b), let ii =)(ϕ  for all Ni∈ , and 
proceed analogously.
  
References 
Albers, H.J. 1996. “Modeling Ecological Constraints on Tropical Forest Management: Spatial 
Interdependence, Irreversibility, and Uncertainty.” Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 30:73-94. 
Ancev, T., A.L. Stoecker, and D.E. Storm. 2003. “Optimal Spatial Allocation of Waste Management 
Practices to Reduce Phosphorus Pollution in a Watershed.” Selected paper presented at the 2003 annual 
meeting of the American Agricultural Economics Association, Montreal, Canada, July 27-30. 
Baumel, W.J., and W.E. Oates. 1998. The Theory of Environmental Policy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Belcher, K., J. Nolan, and P. Phillips. 2003. “Genetically Modified Crops and Agricultural Landscapes: 
Spatial Patterns of Contamination.” Working paper. Department of Agricultural Economics, University 
of Saskatchewan.  
Berliant, M., S. Peng, and P. Wang. 2000. “Production Externalities and Urban Configuration.” Working 
Paper No. 00-W11. Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. April. 
Brasher, P. 2003. “Rules Begin Today on Biotech Crops.” Des Moines Register, August 6. 
Burkard, R.E., E. Cela, V.M. Demidenko, N.N. Metelski, G.J. Woeginger. 1997. “Perspectives of Easy and 
Hard Cases of the Quadratic Assignment Problems.” SFB Report 104. Institute of Mathematics, 
Technical University Graz, Austria. February. 
Burkard, R.E., E. Cela, P.M. Pardalos, and L.S. Pitsoulis. 1998. “The Quadratic Assignment Problem.” In 
Handbook of Combinatorial Optimization. Edited by P.M. Pardalos and D-Z. Du. Amsterdam: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers.  
Calvo-Armengol, A., and Y. Zenou. 2003. “Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social 
Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior.” Discussion Paper No. 3966. Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, London. July. 
Cela, E. 1998. The Quadratic Assignment Problem: Theory and Algorithms. Amsterdam: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
Dosi, C., and T. Tomasi. 1994. Non-point Source Pollution Regulation: Issues and Analysis. Amsterdam: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Hager, W.W., and Y. Krylyuk. 1999. “Graph Partitioning and Continuous Quadratic Programming.” SIAM 
Journal of Discrete Mathematics 12(4): 500-23. 
Helfand, G.E., and J. Rubin. 1994. “Spreading versus Concentrating Damages: Environmental Policy in the 
Presence of Nonconvexities.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 27: 84-91. 
Spatial Arrangements of Externality Generating and Receiving Activities / 35 
Herriges, J.A., S. Secchi, and B.A. Babcock. 2003. “Living with Hogs in Iowa: The Impact of Livestock 
Facilities on Rural Residential Property Values.” CARD Working Paper 03-WP 342. Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University. August.  
Marshall, A.W., and I. Olkin. 1979. Inequalities: Theory of Majorization and Its Applications. San Diego: 
Academic Press. 
Munro, A. n.d. “The Spatial Impact of Genetically Modified Crops.” Working paper. School of Economic 
and Social Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j048/GMspatial.pdf 
(accessed August 18, 2003). 
Parker, D.S. 2000. “Edge-Effect Externalities: Theoretical and Empirical Implications of Spatial 
Heterogeniety.” PhD dissertation. Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of 
California-Davis.  
Perkins, J. 2003. “Genetically Modified Mystery.” Des Moines Register, August 10. 
 
 
